Abstract: Due to the asymmetry of transfer information between principal-agents of professional athletes' transfer in China, it is possible for agents to take advantage of transfer information to realize their own interests and lead to moral risks. Therefore, it is important to effectively solve the moral risks of agents to protect the legitimate rights and interests of transfer subjects and maintain a fair transfer market. Based on principal-agent theory, this paper studies by means of literature review and logical analysis the moral risks of agents and in the transfer of professional athletes in China and their prevention from the principal-agent relationship between agents and clubs, and agents and athletes. It is argued that the moral risks of agent are mainly characterized by various self-profit opportunistic behaviors such as export-to-domestic sales, head-hunting athletes, jeopardizing athletes transfer process, shady contracts and commission violations. The reasons include the lack of incentive mechanism, inadequate supervision mechanism and inadequate punishment mechanism. Based on the above analysis, this paper proposes some measures to prevent the moral risks of agent, including improving the incentive mechanism, the regulatory mechanism, and the punishment mechanism, establishing an early warning-reboot mechanism and strengthening the credibility and reputation mechanism.

Key words: professional sports, manager of club transfering, ethical risk precaution, incentive mechanism, supervision mechanism, punishment mechanism